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Abstract
From an engineering point of view, the survivability of a system is defined as its
ability to continue to operate despite a natural or human-made disturbance; for
example a serious mechanical fault, a human error, or a malicious cyber or physical
attack. In the context of critical infrastructures, due to their relevance for the public
wellness, it is mandatory to improve the robustness of such systems in order to
ensure the availability of essential services such as the distribution of water, gas and
electrical power. Nowadays, due to the increasing number of cyber incidents, the
definition of protection strategies, able to improve the survivability level of this
infrastructure, is at the heart of the scientific debate. In this chapter we propose
a procedure based on three steps aimed at improving infrastructure survivability.
In the first stage we propose some approaches to identify the criticality degree of
each subsystem composing the infrastructure, in the second stage we propose a
method to aggregate multiple criticality evaluations performed by subject matter
experts by providing a unique holistic indicator. Finally, on the basis of such indi-
cator, we propose a protection strategy to improve the robustness of the
entire system.
Keywords: critical nodes, network robustness, protection strategy, optimization
problem, cooperative games
1. Introduction
The physical and cyber protection of critical infrastructures (CIs) is crucial to
ensure the availability of multiple essential services. Concerning the physical secu-
rity aspects, critical infrastructures are, in most cases, complex and geographically
distributed systems hence hard to protect. Regardless of the specific scenario, a CI
can be represented as a set of sub-systems able to interact and cooperate in order to
provide services that are essential for the economy, society and public wellness. For
example, in gas distribution systems, the cooperation of metering and regulation
stations is fundamental to guarantee the proper functioning of the entire infra-
structure. In power grids and water distribution infrastructures, the availability of
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electrical power and water, depends respectively on the joint action of singular
sub-systems such as bus or water supply stations. Analogously, the correct opera-
tion of a plant depends on the right operativeness of several elements as illustrated
by the 4STER European project.
Critical infrastructure are characterized by a high level of interconnection and
interdependency where the operation of a subsystem is essential for the functioning
of others. In such a context, the disruption of a subsystem can easily escalate
creating waterfall effect impacting multiple services and geographic areas. There-
fore, in order to guarantee the functioning of the entire infrastructure it is necessary
to protect adequately each sub-system from fault or exogenous events potentially
capable of compromising normal operativity levels. As reported in [1], on the 28th
September 2003, in Italy and some areas of Switzerland, about 56 million people
lost power due to a storm-tossed tree branch that hit Swiss power lines. About
30,000 people remained trapped in trains, several hundred passengers were
stranded on underground transit systems, and there were significant knock-on
effects across other critical infrastructures. Similarly, the 2005 Hurricane Katrina
[2] caused widespread power outages throughout Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama,
Florida, Kentucky and Tennessee due to the cascading effects initiated by a local
event. Another example is the 2011 Great East Japan earthquake [3] and the
resulting tsunami: 1.5 million households did not have access to their water supply,
4.4 million households were left without electricity, and all the local railway
services were halted, and communications were suspended.
Domino effects over the entire infrastructure due to local fault are not caused
only by accidental faults or natural disasters, but could also be intentionally caused
by malicious actors. For example, with the increasing reliance of CI on Information
& Communication Technology (ICT) malicious actors can perform attacks via
cyberspace triggering service disruptions significant economic losses and even
kinetic effects. This has been particular concerning in relation to the energetic
sector with a significant increase of cyber threats capable of causing outages and
blackout in power systems.
The first example of how a cyber attack can affect the operativity of CI causing
mechanical damage was provided by the Aurora project [4]. This was a test
performed by the Idaho National in which the simulation of a cyberattack led to the
destruction of a 27-ton generator. Another Significant example is represented by the
Stuxnet worm. The worm was able to modify the rotation speed of particular
motors installed inside the centrifuges used for the uranium enrichment in plant in
Iran. Similarly, recent blackouts in Ukraine in 2015 and 2016 were respectively
caused by Blackenergy3 and CrashOverride, two malware specially designed to
cause blackouts via cyber intrusion [5].
In addition, we have to consider impacts on workers’safety. Power plants, water
plants, gas plants can provoke accidents and enormous damages. Seveso plants can
be used for the storage of hazardous materials: an attack aimed at these plants can
also cause a domino effect. The capability to adjust machine parameters in order to
improve performance or simply in order to change behavior can make other people
with criminal intent adjust parameters so that workers and others can be put at risk
of harm. Example of parameters can be speeds, forces, torques that can be put at
dangerous levels. In addition, graphical interfaces used for human-machine inter-
action can be altered so that people could see a situation not corresponding to reality
(not reported error codes or messages, different values of parameters or measures).
In order to identify hazards associated to the use of a machine or a set of machines,
procedures like HAZOP, HAZID, accident reviews must be taken into consider-
ation. Anyway, security and safety must be considered as part of the normal work-
ing processes and not always this happens.
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The main common aspect about these cited events is that a local event is able to
compromise the functionality of the entire plants due to a domino effect. The identifi-
cation of the most critical sub-systems is a crucial point for the definition of effective
protection strategies able to improve the survivability of the systems. To this end, it is
fundamental to identify adequate metrics and indicators to quantify the criticality rate
associated to each sub-system, especially in highly heterogeneous contexts.
1.1 Related works
From the literature, one of the typical strategies to obtain such metrics is to
simulate the effects of negative events, such as local faults, in order to provide
insights on the most critical elements, for which protection needs to be raised. In
particular, a well-established approach is to focus on intentional attacks, considering a
rational attacker that aims at maximizing the damage while keeping low the effort
required for his/her malicious action. Starting from the seminal works of Arulsevan
et al. [6] it has become paramount that attacks that take into account the topology of
the infrastructure, can select more effectively the target sites, increasing the damage
dealt (e.g., in terms of disconnection of large portions of the infrastructure by causing
services interruption). In [7–10] multiple approaches for the identification of critical
nodes in infrastructure networks are presented. All these methods consists in optimi-
zation problems able to discover the nodes whose removal from the network com-
promise the connectivity of the entire system. All these approaches requires initial
assumptions about the attacker budget and preferences despite this information are
not available in general in a real context. Moreover, the results of these approaches
are able to highlight the most critical node in a network but not provide a metric
capable of quantifying the degree of criticality for each node of the infrastructure. In
more details, the approach presented in [7] proposes a method, able to identify the
most critical nodes, based on the result of an optimization problem characterized by
the presence of assumptions about the strategy of an attacker in terms of available
budget and dimension of disconnected components. Similar assumptions are consid-
ered also in the approach presented in [8, 9], the authors propose a method which
aims at minimizing the attack cost against the infrastructure with constraints about
the features of the network. Finally, assumptions about the attacker preferences are
also required in the formulation presented in [10]. In general, centrality measures,
such as the node degree or betweenness centrality are often adopted as criticality
measures, while in [11] the authors propose a critical index for the elements of a CI by
analyzing the solutions of a multi objective optimization problem without any
assumption about the attacker behaviour. However, the adoption of a unique metric
or indicator about the criticality rate of each node of the system is quite unrealistic
due to the complex nature of the infrastructures. Two approaches able to consider
multiple metrics with the aim to compute a final aggregated criticality holistic indi-
cator are presented in [12, 13]. The proposed approaches take into account multiple
indicators based on multiple data source (topology data, field-related data, expert
evaluations, etc.) but not provide a final step necessary to define a defensive strategy
and evaluate its effectiveness.
1.2 Contribution and outline of the chapter
In this chapter we want to propose a procedure able to define a defensive
strategy for CIs based on multiple node criticality measures. In more details, the
procedure is based on three steps, as depicted in Figure 1: In the first stage (Section
2) we provide some specific criticality measure for CIs based on the connectivity of
the system. The identification of the criticality measures is a fundamental stage in
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the defensive strategy definition process. In literature, graph centrality measures
are often adopted as criticality measures for infrastructure but these approaches
(e.g. Node degree or node betweenness) are quite ineffective as proved in [11]. In
the second stage (Section 3) a methodology to merge multiple criticality metrics,
based on the well-known Analytic Hierarchy Process [14], is described in order to
overcome the limit about the application of a single metric in a complex environ-
ment. Moreover, such methodology allows considering also the criticality evalua-
tions given for a subset of infrastructure nodes. The definition of the defensive
strategy is provided in the last step (Section 4) and its effectiveness is proved by
analyzing the global robustness of the network with respect to multiple robustness
evaluation methods. Finally, in (Section 5), the application of the three-step proce-
dure is illustrated with respect to the case study network with the aim of proving
the effectiveness of the proposed strategy.
1.3 Notation
Let us denote by ∣X∣ the cardinality of a set X; moreover, we represent vectors
via boldface letters, and we use km to indicate a vector in 
m whose components are
all equal to k, while by In we identify the n n identity matrix. Finally, we denote
the sign of x∈ by sign xð Þ and by sign Xð Þ the entry-wise sign of a matrix X. Let
G ¼ V,Ef g denote a graph with a finite number n of nodes vi ∈V and e edges
vi, v j
 
∈E⊆V  V, from node vi to node v j. A graph is said to be undirected if
vi, v j
 
∈Ewhenever v j, vi
 
∈E (see Figure 2). The adjacency matrix of a graph G is
an n n matrix A such that Aij ¼ 1 if v j, vi
 
∈E and Aij ¼ 0 otherwise. A path over
an undirected graph G ¼ V,Ef g, starting at a node vi ∈V and ending at a node
Figure 1.
Flow chart of the proposed three-steps procedure.
Figure 2.
Example of a graph G ¼ V,Ef g with ∣n∣ ¼ 5 nodes and ∣E∣ ¼ 6 edges.
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v j ∈V, is a subset of links in E that connects vi and v j without creating loops. An
undirected graph G ¼ V,Ef g is connected if each node can be reached by each other
node by means of the links in E.
For the sake of clarity, we report here the notation adopted in the rest of the
chapter.
ci Removal cost for node vi
PWC Gð Þ Pairwise connectivity of G
NPWC A, xð Þ Normalized pairwise connectivity for a graph with
adjacency matrix A and without considering nodes vi s:t:xi ¼ 0
P Pareto Front
χi Critical index for node vi
P Set of players in the cooperative game
Γ P, gð Þ Cooperative game for players in P
evaluated via characteristic function g
ϕi Shapley value for player i
Mi i‐th metric
m Number of metrics
r ið Þa =r
ið Þ
b Relative utility ratio among alternatives i and j according to metric i
Riab Matrix of utility ratios among alternatives aandbaccording to metric i
B Defensive budget
wi Relevance of metric i
Y
Global robustness index
2. Node criticality metrics based on network connectivity
As mentioned above the first step of the proposed approach for the identification
of a defensive strategy is the identification of metrics of interests able to evaluate the
network criticalities from multiple points of view. Despite in literature this process is
often reduced to a simple centrality measure computation, in this section we propose
two other applicable approaches, based on the infrastructure connectivity, to com-
pute the criticality of each sub-systems of a CI. For the sake of clarity, in this context
we represent the entire infrastructure via undirected graph G ¼ V,Ef g where V is
the set of n nodes vi, (each node represents a sub-system of the CI) and E⊆V  V is
the set of e undirected edges vi, v j
 
. An edge connects two nodes if a real physical
connection exists between the two corresponding sub-systems.
Both the approaches for the critical node identification, presented in this section
are based on the concept of connectivity. In our models, when a node is attacked
and is unable to operate, we remove the node and the incident edges from the
graph. The deletion of particular critical nodes could compromise the connectivity
of the other elements of the network. Notice that, for each node vi we consider a
removal cost ci >0. With the aim to measure the degree of connectivity of the graph
G, we adopt the Pairwise Connectivity (PWC), it is an index that captures the
overall degree of connectivity of a graph on the basis of the couples of nodes
connected by means of edges in G.
PWC Gð Þ ¼
X
vi, v jð Þ∈VV, vi 6¼v j
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where p vi, v j
 
is 1 if the pair vi, v j
 
is connected via a path in G, and is zero
otherwise. Noting that the maximum number of couples of nodes in a graph with n
nodes is n n1ð Þ2 , the normalized pairwise connectivity (NPWC) is defined as:
NPWC Gð Þ ¼
2PWC Gð Þ
n n 1ð Þ
∈ 0, 1½ : (2)
Remark 1 NPWC Gð Þ is a measure of connectivity of the graph G, in fact, it is
easy to note that
G connected⇔NPWC Gð Þ ¼ 1: (3)
When NPWC Gð Þ< 1, the graph is not connected, but the larger NPWC Gð Þ is,
the more G is “close” to be a connected graph. □
We now provide a more descriptive definition of a NPWC by taking into
account a subset of attacked nodes. Let A be the adjacency matrix of an undirected
graph G ¼ V,Ef g and let x∈n be a column vector whose entries xi = 0 if the i-th
node has been removed due to an attack or a fault and xi = 1 otherwise, we define
the connectivity as:









n n 1ð Þ
(4)
where Âij ¼ Aijxix j, 1n is a column vector composed by n entries equal to 1.
2.1 A critical index based on optimization problem
The definition of the Critical Index χi for a node vi, come directly from the
solutions of a multi-objective problem defined by assuming the point of view of a
malicious attacker.
In Eq. (5) the behavior of an attacker is defined as a multi-objective optimization
problem characterized by two conflicting objectives: the reduction of the connec-
tivity in terms of NPWC and the simultaneous minimization of the required attack
effort in terms of removal cost. We reiterate that if an attacker want to disconnect a
node vi from the graph then (s)he must pay a cost ci.
Problem 1
min f xð Þ ¼ min f 1 xð Þ, f 2 xð Þ
 T
,
x∈ 0, 1f gn
(5)
where x represents the vector of decision variables, whose entries xi are equal to
0 if the node vi is involved in the attack, 1 otherwise and where
f 1 ¼ NPWC A,xð Þ (6)
and
f 2 ¼
cT 1n  xð Þ
1Tc
(7)
where c ¼ c1 … cn½ 
T is the vector whose entries represent the cost necessary to
remove each node from the graph.
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As described in [11], in general, a multi-objective problem is characterized by
the presence of multiple optimal solutions x jð Þ collected in the Pareto front set P.
Each solution is associated to a couple of values f 1 x
jð Þ
 




the two objective functions. In other words, each optimal solution x jð Þ represents a




attack effort f 2 x
jð Þ
 
as depicted in Figure 3.
In [11], the Critical Index χi is defined as in Eq. (8):
χi ¼
P





where ∣P∣ represents the number of solutions in the Pareto front. In other
words it is defined as the ratio between the frequency with which a node vi is
involved in the attacks listed in the Pareto front and its cardinality. If the critical
index χi is close to 0 this implies that the node is rarely involved in attack plans,
instead, the closer it is to 1, more frequently the node is involved in optimal attack
strategies.
2.2 A critical index based on a cooperative game
An alternative approach for the identification of the most critical nodes in a
network is presented in [15]. Analogously to the critical index based on the
results of the multi-objective optimization problem, the proposed method is
based on the concept of NPWC. Differently from the previous critical index,
this measure come from the game theory and is based on the solution of a
cooperative game.
A cooperative game, sometimes called a value game or a profit game, is a
competition among groups of players. Formally, a cooperative game is defined by a
set of players P and a characteristic function v : 2N ) þ which associate to all
possible coalitions of players a utility rate. The function describes how much
collective payoff a set of players can gain by forming a coalition.
Figure 3.
Pareto front: the optimal solutions set for multi-objective optimization problem.
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Let P be the set of players, and g : 2P ) þ a function that satisfies the following
properties:
• g ∅ð Þ ¼ 0
• Superadditive property: if S,T ∈ 2P s:t: S∩T ¼ ∅, then v S∪Tð Þ≥ g Sð Þ þ g Tð Þ
The cooperative game Γ P, gð Þ is defined by the couple P, gð Þ where the elements
of P are the players of the game and the characteristic function of the game g Sð Þ
estimates the utility of each coalition S∈ 2P.
Cooperative games can be solved via multiple approaches, the Shapley value [16]
is one of the possible concepts of solution. The Shapley value assigns to each player
i∈P, a reward ϕi. The larger is the contribution given by i in all the possible coalitions
of players, based on the function g, the larger is the reward ϕi for the player i.
The Shapley value is a column vector Φ whose entries are ϕi are defined






∣S∣! njSj1ð Þ! g S∪ if gð Þ  g Sð Þð Þ (9)
With the aim to adopt these concepts to provide a critical index able to quantify
the criticality of each node of the network, a cooperative game Γ N, nPWCð Þ is
defined. The set of players is represented by the set of nodes N while the charac-
teristic function g is NPWC (Eq. (3)). Notice that, in [15], it is demonstrated that
the NPWC satisfy the two fundamental properties of a characteristic function.
The solution of the proposed game will assign a reward to each node in V
proportional to its contribution to the connectivity expressed in terms of NPWC,
hence the Shapley value can be considered a valid node criticality metric.
3. A multi-criteria vulnerability detection index
As briefly introduced in Section 1, a research of the most critical nodes based on
a single metric is practically worthless and extremely simplistic. In this section we
propose an approach able to provide a holistic indicator able to take into account
multiple criticality evaluations based on multiple metrics also in presence of
incomplete data. The proposed method is based on the well-known Analytic Hier-
archy Process (AHP) introduced by Saaty [17]. For a given set of m alternatives,
relative utility ratios ri=r j are defined by experts. Such a setting is typical in contexts
involving human decision-makers, which are usually more comfortable providing
relative comparisons among the utilities of the different alternatives (e.g., “Alter-
native i is twice better than alternative j”), rather than directly assessing an absolute
utility value of each alternative (i..e, “The value of alternative i is ...”). The AHP is a
procedure able to estimate the absolute utilities ri starting from the given utility
ratios ri=r j. See [17] for additional notions about the AHP.
We now suppose to have m different metrics M1 …Mm. According to these
metrics, the entries of the column vectors r 1ð Þ … r mð Þ represents the criticality rate of
each node of the graph. Notice that the method is applicable also if for some metrics
the criticality ratio of some node is not available [12]. Finally, let w1 …wm be
positive weights defined by subject-matter experts (SMEs) representing the rele-
vance of each metric. The larger is the weight associated to the i-th metric, the
larger the influence of such metric in the final holistic indicator. Such weights can
8
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be obtained also resolving AHP on the basis of pair-wise comparisons between the
different metrics.

















In other words, the matrix R ið Þ collects the relative utility ratios between the a-th
and b-th nodes according to the i-th metric if both the evaluation are available.
Notice that some ratio r ið Þa =r
ið Þ
b might be undefined if r
ið Þ
b ¼ 0, due to this reason, we
treat zero-valued entries as not available data.
By considering the matrices R ið Þ, we aim at finding the aggregated holistic
indicator r ∗ ∈n that solves the following problem.
Problem 2 Find r ∗ ∈n that solves
r ∗ ¼ argmin
r∈nþ













ln R ið Þab
 
 log rað Þ þ log rbð Þ
 2
(11)
The holistic indicator r ∗ is a new node criticality measure that represents a
compromise between the m initial metrics M1 …Mm by taking into account the
SMEs preferences wi. In other words, Problem 2 aims at finding the criticality





deviation from the ratios R ið Þ for the m considered metrics.
4. Defensive strategy definition and evaluation
In this section we propose a methodology to define a defensive strategy able to
improve the survivability of the network with a focus on the connectivity mainte-
nance with respect to nodes deletion. As introduced in Section 2, an attack cost ci is
associated to each node vi. Our aim is the definition of a new distribution of the
budget in order to minimize the loss of connectivity in case of malicious attacks.
Let B ¼
Pn
i¼1ci the defensive budget computed on the basis of the initial removal
costs. We propose a new allocation of the budget by defining the removal cost
proportionally to the holistic indicator r ∗ described in Section 3. Hence, we define








It is now necessary evaluate the robustness of a network with a particular
defensive strategy. As introduced in Section 2.1, due to its multi-objective nature,
Problem 1 is characterized by the presence of multiple optimal solutions collected in
the Pareto front P. Each optimal solution x jð Þ is associated to a couple of values: a
particular connectivity value f 1 x
jð Þ
 
and an attack cost f 2 x
jð Þ
 
, where f 1 and f 2
represent the two objective function of Problem 1.
In [11], the global robustness index
Q
is defined as the area under the polygonal
chain connecting the points ( f 1 x
jð Þ
 
, f 2 x
jð Þ
 
) in the Pareto front using trapezoidal
rule for numerical integration.
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As depicted in Figure 3,
Q
is a measure of the overall robustness of the network.
In fact, the larger is the area, the higher is the value of the objectives associated to
the solutions in the Pareto front; hence, high values of the global robustness index
correspond to networks where the attacker is not able to deal large damage, or deals
large damage only for large effort.
5. Case study
In this section we prove the effectiveness of the proposed three-stage method-
ology able to improve the network survivability via critical nodes protection. The
proposed strategy is tested on the CI represented by the network depicted in
Figure 4. Notice that the case study is based on a network that does not represents a
real infrastructure. The network is composed by n ¼ 15 nodes and e ¼ 35 edges. As
discussed in Section 2, the first step of the methodology is devoted to the identifi-
cation of criticality measures able to take into account the effects about the discon-
nection of a node from the graph by evaluating the loss of connectivity of the entire
infrastructure. Notice that, the removal costs ci are set to 1 for each node of the
infrastructure.
The first columns in Table 1 collect the metrics defined by Eqs. 5 and 6 respec-
tively. Concerning the distribution of the critical indices χi, the largest value are
associated to the nodes 10 and 3. Notice that, the deletion of such nodes divides the
nodes in two partitions, hence it strongly compromises the connectivity of the
network in terms of nPWC.
Similar results are obtained by considering the computation of the Shapley value
in order to solve the cooperative game as described in Section 2.2. We remark that
this approach assigns a reward to each node of the network according to their
contribution to the connectivity of the entire network by considering all the possi-
ble partitions of nodes. Notice that, the results computed via Shapley not consider
the removal cost ci while the results of Problem 1 take into account also this aspect,
moreover, in this case study all the removal costs ci are set to 1.
Finally, the fourth and fifth columns of Table 1 collect the node degree and the
betweenness centrality [18] for each node in the graph.
Figure 4.
Case study network. The node color depends on the holistic criticality rate computed via Eq. (7).
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In the last column of Table 1, we show the criticality rate for each node
according to the new holistic indicator computed as in Eq. (7) considering m=4
metrics (i.e. the critical index, the Shapley Value, the node Degree and the
Betweenness centrality). According to the procedure defined in Section 3, we have
set the metric relevance as follows: w1 ¼ 0:3, w2 ¼ 0:3, w3 ¼ 0:2, and w4 ¼ 0:2 in
order to emphasize the criticality metrics based on the concept of PWC.
The nodes color in Figure 4 depends on the aggregated criticality values,
according to the colormap. On the basis of this new indicator, the node 10 is the
most critical node of the graph, in fact the deletion of this node strongly compro-
mise the connectivity of the network and the creation of two disconnected parti-
tions. Due to the same reason, a high criticality rate is also assigned to the nodes 4
and 3. Despite the node 14 is not essential for the connectivity, this node is charac-
terized by a high node degree, in fact it is considered, according to the holistic
indicator, as the fourth most critical node in the network.
Starting from the results obtained by computing the holistic indicator r ∗ , we
adopt a defensive strategy by defining a new attack cost ĉi, for each node, propor-




The effectiveness of the proposed defensive strategy is proved by considering
the global robustness index
Q
, we remark that it came from the solution of Problem
1 and it is defined as the area under the Pareto front. As depicted in Figure 5, the
new allocation of the defensive budget B is very effective to contrast an attacker
especially with limited budget. In more details, in case of uniform defensive strat-
egy (i.e. all the attack costs set to 1) the area under the Pareto front is equal to
Q
¼
0:1229, while the new budget allocation (Eq. (8)) based on the holistic indicator r ∗
improves the network robustness by increasing the area to
Q
¼ 0:1591.
Node Critical Index χ i
a Shapley Value ϕi
b Degree Betweenness Holistic Indicator ri ∗
c
1 0.1111 0.0354 2 0 0.0360
2 0.1852 0.0493 4 0 0.0587
3 0.2863 0.0952 4 24 0.1003
4 0.2593 0.1465 3 45 0.1143
5 0.0370 0.0354 2 0 0.0238
6 0.1111 0.0493 4 0 0.0484
7 0.1111 0.0521 6 3.5 0.0491
8 0.2593 0.0547 7 2 0.0618
9 0.1481 0.0515 3 15 0.0580
10 0.2963 0.1635 5 48 0.1389
11 0.0741 0.0515 3 15 0.0465
12 0.1852 0.0521 6 3.5 0.0577
13 0.1852 0.0521 6 3.5 0.0577
14 0.2222 0.0567 8 19.5 0.0871
15 0.2593 0.0547 7 2 0.0618
aCriticality measure based on Eq. (5).
bCriticality measure based on Eq. (6).
cHolistic Indicator based on Eq. (7).
Table 1.
Criticality evaluations based on four different metrics and computed holistic indicator.
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6. Conclusions
In this chapter we provide a methodology for the definition of a defensive
strategy via prioritizing the critical nodes of the network. Due to the complexity of a
CI, the adoption of a unique metric for the identification of the node criticality is
simplistic, to this end we propose a strategy, based on the AHP, able to merge
multiple metrics which take into different aspects of the network. Moreover, the
proposed aggregation procedure is applicable also in case of incomplete data.
Among the multiple metrics applicable in the merging process, in this chapter
we propose two metrics characterized by a focus on the network connectivity.
In the one hand the critical index is computed on the basis of a multi objective
optimization problem. Assuming an attacker perspective and knowing the topology
of the network, the problems aims at identifying the nodes whose removal com-
promise the connectivity of the entire system. On the other hand, we propose the
adoption of the Shapley value as a criticality evaluation by defining a cooperative
game among the nodes of the network. Finally, we propose the definition of a
defensive strategy that assigns to each node a removal cost proportional to
the holistic indicator. Future improvement will be devoted to the inclusion of a
final check able to include a final validation based on expert opinions. One
of the possible validity check is based on the well-known face validity
approach [19], it refers to the transparency or relevance of a test as it appears to
test participants.
Figure 5.
Results of problem 1. Pareto fronts obtained by applying defensive strategies based on the holistic indicator
(blue line), and uniform attack costs (red line).
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